Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
U. S. Supreme Court Briefs

Faculty Scholarship

8-24-2015

Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars
In Support Of Petitioners
Richard W. Garnett
Notre Dame Law School, rgarnett@nd.edu

Ryan A. Shores
Hunton & Williams LLP

William J. Haun
Hunton & Williams LLP

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/sct_briefs
Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars In Support Of Petitioners, 136 S.Ct. 446 (2015) (No. 15-105).

This Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in U. S. Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105,
15-119, & 15-191
IN THE

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR HOME FOR THE AGED,
DENVER COLORADO, ET AL.
Petitioners,
v.
SYLVIA MATTHEWS BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.
Respondents.
_______________
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD, FIFTH, TENTH, AND DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUITS
_______________
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW SCHOLARS IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS
_______________
RYAN A. SHORES
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM J. HAUN
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 955-1500
rshores@hunton.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................ 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 7
I.

RFRA HARMONIZES RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THIRD-PARTY
INTERESTS. .........................................................7

II. THERE IS NO BASIS TO CONCLUDE THAT
THE POSSIBILITY OF “SUBSTANTIAL”
THIRD-PARTY HARMS PRECLUDES
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS. .............................13
III. THE THIRD-PARTY HARM OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE THAT IS NOT “SEAMLESS”
FAILS AS A COMPELLING INTEREST. .........24
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 31
LIST OF AMICI ........................................................ 1a

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet,
512 U.S. 687 (1994) ............................................ 11
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n,
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) .................................. 26, 27
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) .................................passim
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) ............................................ 29
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987) .....................................passim
Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709 (2005) .....................................passim
Emp’t Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) .................................. 7, 23, 24
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,
472 U.S. 703 (1985) ................................ 12, 18, 19
Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971) ............................................ 21
Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) ...................................... 26, 27
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) ............................................ 10
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n,
480 U.S. 136 (1987) ........................................ 3, 14

iii
Holt v. Hobbs,
135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) .................................... 10, 25
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) .............................. 13, 14, 15
Mockaitis v. Harcleroad,
104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................ 21
New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) ............................................ 15
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) ............................................ 26
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984) ............................................ 10
Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) ............................................ 25
Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443 (2011) ............................................ 15
Texas Monthly v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) ........... 12, 13
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63 (1977) ........................................ 18, 19
Union P.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n.,
248 U.S. 67 (1918) .............................................. 30
United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78 (1944) .............................................. 11
United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) ............................................ 21
Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970) ........................................ 3, 21
Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) ............................................ 25

iv
STATUTES
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) ...................................... 29
42 U.S.C. § 238n ...................................................... 23
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (2006) ................................ 22
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V. 1993) .......................... 2
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) & (b) (Supp. V. 1993) ......... 8
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V. 1993).....................
......................................................................... 8, 16
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b) (Supp. V. 1993).....................
......................................................................... 8, 16
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) ............................................... 8
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) ................................................. 18
42 U.S.C. § 18011 .................................................... 28
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108–447, § 508, 118 Stat. 2809, 3163
(2004) .................................................................. 23
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110–161, § 508(d)(1), 121 Stat. 1844,
2209..................................................................... 23
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488-89 .................... 2
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a) & (b) ............................... 8
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a) .................................. 8, 16
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(b) .................................. 8, 16
OTHER AUTHORITIES
26 C.F.R. 1.6033-2(h) ............................................... 29
45 C.F.R. 147.131(a) ................................................ 29
78 Fed. Reg. at 39,870 ............................................. 29

v
78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874 ....................................... 29, 30
102d Cong. 192 (1992) ............................................. 23
119 CONG. REC. 9602 (1973) .................................... 22
139 CONG. REC. 9685 (1993) .................................... 23
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 793 (2006)..................................................... 9
Carl H. Esbeck, Third-Party Harms,
Congressional Statutes Accommodating
Religion, and the Establishment Clause 8
(Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, No. 2015-10, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607277. ........ 17, 18, 31
Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of
Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment
Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793
(2006) .................................................................... 8
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew
Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an
Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate
the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV
EN BANC 51 (2014) ................................................ 3
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An
Unconstitutional Accommodation of
Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343
(2014) .............................................. 2, 9, 19, 24, 31

vi
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Exemptions from the
‘Contraception Mandate’ Threaten
Religious Liberty, WASH. POST (Jan. 15,
2014) ..................................................................... 2
James W. Tollefson, THE STRENGTH NOT TO
FIGHT: AN ORAL HISTORY OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS OF THE
VIETNAM WAR (1993) .......................................... 21
Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of
Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 177 (1993) ...................................... 22
Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By
Moonlight 24 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 152587216, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2587216 ..................... 10
Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not
To Kill, 62 EMORY L.J. 121 (2012) ............... 21, 22
Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger &
Nelson Tebbe, Hobbs and Third Party
Harms, BALKINIZATION BLOG (Jan. 22,
2015) ..................................................................... 2
Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger &
Nelson Tebbe, Hobby Lobby and the
Establishment Clause, Part II: What
Counts As A Burden on Employees?,
BALKINIZATION BLOG (Dec. 4, 2013) ................... 20
Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger &
Nelson Tebbe, The Establishment Clause
and the Contraception Mandate,
BALKINIZATION BLOG (Nov. 27, 2013) ................ 24

vii
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs
Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S.
Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995) ................ 7, 25
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685
(1992). ....................................................... 9, 13, 14
Oral Argument Transcript, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (Mar. 25,
2014) ............................................................... 4, 28
Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation,
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67
VAND. L. REV EN BANC 39 (2014).......................... 7
William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political
Actors in Accommodation of Religion, 22 U.
HAW. L. REV. 403 (2000) ....................................... 7

1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici are constitutional law scholars who
possess an acute interest in a reasoned development
of constitutional doctrine.
A full list of amici is provided as an Appendix
to this brief.

Counsel for all parties have submitted blanket consent to
the filing of amicus briefs in this case. No counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part. No person or entity
other than amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary
contribution that was intended to fund preparing or submitting
this brief.
1

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
“[I]n a complex society and an era of pervasive
governmental regulation, defining the proper realm
for free exercise can be difficult.” Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781, 2785 (2014)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 2 addresses that difficulty
by harmonizing religious freedom and the interests
of third parties. RFRA will not exempt free exercise
from a law’s command simply because the law
substantially burdens religion—nor will it deny a
religious exemption simply because the exemption
would affect a third party.
However, some seek to supplant RFRA’s
framework with a novel, one-sided constitutional
doctrine that downplays a law’s burden on religion.
Several scholars contend that the Establishment
Clause bans religious exemptions that “require[]
people to bear the burden of religions to which they
do not belong and whose teachings they do not
practice.” 3 In this case, these scholars argue, a
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488-89; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(Supp. V. 1993).
3
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Exemptions from the
‘Contraception Mandate’ Threaten Religious Liberty, WASH.
POST
(Jan.
15,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/exemptions-from-thecontraception-mandate-threaten-religiousliberty/2014/01/15/f5cb9bd0-7d79-11e3-93c10e888170b723_story.html; see also Micah Schwartzman,
Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Holt v. Hobbs and Third
Party Harms, BALKINIZATION BLOG (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/01/holt-v-hobbs-and-thirdparty-harms.html; Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.2

3
RFRA exemption would substantially burden the
right of women to “seamless” coverage of
abortifacients and contraceptives and therefore is
constitutionally invalid.
These contentions are
misplaced.
RFRA incorporates Establishment Clause
limits on religious accommodations:
it applies
equally to all religions and takes into account the
government’s interest in protecting third parties
when that interest is compelling. 4 There is no
support in constitutional doctrine or theory for an
Establishment Clause limit on religious exemptions
that do not conflict with a government interest that
is less than compelling. Rather, the Court has
consistently held that there is “play in the joints”
between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause allowing for legislative action.
See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713, 71920 (2005) (per Ginsburg, J.) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987) (“This
Court has long recognized that the government may
(and sometimes must) accommodate religious
practices and that it may do so without violating the
Establishment Clause.”). The suggestion that the
Establishment Clause prevents RFRA from
C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew
Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby
Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 51 (2014).
4
This case does not present an Establishment Clause concern
over RFRA’s protection of religious exercise. Even if it did, the
proper remedy under that Clause is to extend exemptions to
religious-like objections. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 351-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).

4
operating according to its own terms lacks any
support in the Court’s cases addressing the Religion
Clauses.
Indeed, the Court has left no doubt that RFRA
falls within the constitutional “space for legislative
action [that is] neither compelled by the Free
Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment
Clause,” see Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719. See Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“It is certainly true
that in applying RFRA ‘courts must take adequate
account of the burdens a requested accommodation
may impose on nonbeneficiaries.’ That consideration
will often inform the analysis of the Government’s
compelling interest and the availability of a less
restrictive means of advancing that interest.”)
(quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720).
The scholars’
argument thus conflicts with the Court’s repeated
application of RFRA, 5 with the government’s own
argument in Hobby Lobby, 6 and even with Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in Hobby Lobby. 7
RFRA’s
See Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (“We reaffirm[] . . . the
feasibility of case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions
to generally applicable rules.”).
6 See Oral Arg. Tr. at 43:3-7, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., No. 13-354 (Mar. 25, 2014) (Justice Alito: “Well, is it your
argument that providing the accommodation that’s requested
here would violate the Establishment Clause?”
General
Verrilli: “It’s not our argument that it would violate the
Establishment Clause.”).
7 See, e.g., 134 S. Ct. at 2802 n.25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Lee, which is not an Establishment
Clause case, to say that “one person’s right to free exercise must
be kept in harmony with the rights of her fellow citizens, and
‘some religious practices [must] yield to the common good.’”)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)).
5

5
compelling interest test has been shown to be fully
constitutional.
Imposing the Establishment Clause as an
extraneous limit on exemptions under RFRA would
upend thousands of religious-exemption statutes.
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“By
framing any Government regulation as benefiting a
third party, the Government could turn all
regulations into entitlements to which nobody could
object on religious grounds . . . .”). Not even statutes
that allow individuals and entities absolute
protection from being forced to provide or pay for
abortions would be exempt from its sweep.
There is at least one reason why some scholars
may prefer a new constitutional test that considers
“substantial” third-party harms outside of the RFRA
analysis: “Seamless” coverage of abortifacients and
contraceptives is not a compelling government
interest that can justify denying an exemption to the
Little Sisters of the Poor and other religious
nonprofits.
This new test would change the
“baseline” of rights and make RFRA the problem.
But,
this
Court’s
jurisprudence
requires
understanding RFRA as preserving the rights of
religious claimants and third parties as they were
before the Affordable Care Act burdened religion.
Congress’ and the Department of Health and Human
Services’ (“HHS”) own practice reveals the wisdom of
the Court’s jurisprudence over the new “baseline”
offered by some scholars.
“RFRA is inconsistent with the insistence of
an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between
different religious believers—burdening one while
accommodating the other—when it may treat both

6
equally . . . .” Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The Affordable Care Act exempted tens-of-millions of
Americans from “seamless” coverage of abortifacients
and contraceptives when it excluded “grandfathered”
plans and small businesses from its reach. HHS
then exempted many more Americans when it
excluded churches and their integrated auxiliaries
from the coverage mandate. By the Affordable Care
Act’s own terms and HHS’ own determination,
“seamless”
coverage
of
abortifacients
and
contraceptives is to be unavailable to many
Americans. The government’s underinclusiveness
belies the claim that “seamless” coverage is now a
compelling interest because the Little Sisters of the
Poor seek the same exemption already given to
churches and their integrated auxiliaries.
Moreover, the abortion context reveals that an
interest in “seamless” access—even “seamless” access
to a right deemed by this Court to be protected by
the Constitution—is not sufficient to justify a
substantial religious burden. More broadly, if there
is a compelling interest in ensuring “seamless”
health-insurance coverage of important services, it is
hardly unique to women seeking coverage of
abortifacients and contraceptives.
But the
government is not pursuing that interest elsewhere.
There can thus be no entitlement to “seamless”
access.
Congress could have exempted the Affordable
Care Act from the application of RFRA. It did not.
Instead, RFRA is incorporated within it, meaning
that no benefit the Affordable Care Act provides can
be contemplated as standing without RFRA and its
“stringent test.” See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at

7
2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “One may not like the
compelling interest test, but there it is in black and
white.” Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs
Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56
MONT. L. REV. 249, 251 (1995) (emphasis in original).
“Seamless” coverage cannot satisfy that test, and
there is no Establishment Clause bypass around it.
RFRA’s framework structures the difficult harmony
of interests that is critical to the dignity of the people
involved and our national identity. It cannot and
should not be circumvented.
ARGUMENT
I.

RFRA HARMONIZES RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THIRD-PARTY
INTERESTS.

“[A] society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be
expected to be solicitous of that value in its
legislation . . . .” Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990). When Congress enacted RFRA in light of
the Court’s decision in Smith, it manifested
“solicitousness” towards the social value of religious
exercise and respected the role of the political
process in harmonizing religious exemptions with
other social values. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett,
Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of
Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 44-45 (2014);
William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political Actors in
Accommodation of Religion, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 403
(2000).
RFRA followed from this nation’s long
tradition of preserving free exercise through
politically-enacted exemptions. Indeed, while some

8
framers debated whether they were constitutionally
compelled, “there is virtually no evidence that
anyone thought [regulatory exemptions] were
constitutionally prohibited or that they were part of
an establishment of religion.” Douglas Laycock,
Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the
Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1796 (2006) (emphasis
in original). The harmony RFRA achieved between
the right of free exercise and other compelling
interests is apparent throughout its structure.
RFRA is at once both sweeping and reserved.
It supersedes all prior, inconsistent federal law, 8
presumptively applies to all future federal law, 9 and
applies to federal law’s implementation. 10 But, if
Congress does not want RFRA to apply to a given
statute (perhaps out of a concern for third parties), it
can simply exempt the statute from RFRA. 11 RFRA
generally
prohibits
the
government
from
“substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability,” but the government may still
do so when its law, “appli[ed] . . . to the person (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.” 12 RFRA
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V. 1993).
9 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(b), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-3(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
10 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V. 1993).
11 See supra note 9.
12 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a) & (b), 107 Stat. at 1488-89; 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(b), § 2000bb-1(a) & (b) (Supp. V. 1993). Even
as RFRA employs “strict scrutiny”—the most demanding
8

9
calls for a harmonizing of other interests with
religious exercise, and the exemptions it requires do
not violate the Establishment Clause. See O Centro,
546 U.S. at 436; Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and A
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685,
698 (1992).
Indeed, even the scholars urging a ban on
religious exemptions that accompany “substantial”
third-party harms concede that “RFRA seems
facially to comply with the Establishment Clause . . .
.” 13 These scholars contend that RFRA’s “permissive
accommodations” which “impose significant burdens
on third parties who do not believe or participate in
the
accommodated
practice”
violate
the
Establishment Clause. 14 But this view presumes
that RFRA’s consideration of third-party harms is
inadequate and that resort to the Establishment
Clause is required. The Court has rejected these
premises.
Hobby Lobby confirmed that RFRA calls for
considering third-party harms within its analysis of
standard in constitutional law—when evaluating the
government’s interest in burdening free exercise, the
government prevails more often than not in religious-exemption
cases. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:
An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts,
59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 861-62 (2006) (concluding that, with 74%
of religious exemption claims being rejected in the sample,
“there is a major difference between strict scrutiny’s deadliness
as applied in exemption cases compared to discrimination
cases.”).
13 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 348 (emphasis in
original).
14 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 349.
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a compelling government interest being pursued
through the least-restrictive means. See 134 S. Ct.
at 2781 n.37; see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853,
863 (2015) (explaining that the Court will
“scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific
exemptions to particular religious claimants” when
assessing a compelling interest) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). This makes sense:
“Indeed, one might simply say that compelling state
interests just exactly are third party interests of
adequate gravity. Whose interests is the government
protecting in resisting a religious accommodation if
not those of third parties?” 15 RFRA’s own framework
thus starts with—and depends upon—considering
third-party interests. For that reason, the Court has
not found it necessary to resort to the Establishment
Clause when considering RFRA claims.
In Cutter, the Court confirmed that RFRA’s
framework responds appropriately to Establishment
15 Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight 24 (St.
John’s Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
15-2587216, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2587216 (emphasis
in original). Considering third-party harms as a facet of a
compelling-government-interest analysis is commonplace in
constitutional law. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (explaining that the
“fundamental object” of banning race discrimination in public
accommodations “was to vindicate the deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to
public establishments.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623,
625 (1984) (explaining that the compelling government interest
in “eradicating discrimination against its female citizens” exists
because sex discrimination “both deprives persons of their
individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide
participation in political, economic, and cultural life.”).

11
Clause concerns over religious exemptions. The
Court explained that the Religious Land Use
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA,” which
possesses the same statutory framework of RFRA)
raises no Establishment Clause issue. The Court
identified three Establishment Clause problems that
religious exemptions could cause: (1) an unyielding
preference
for
religion;
(2)
denominational
favoritism; and (3) inadequate consideration of thirdparty harms. See 544 U.S. at 719-20. These
concerns do not mean, as the Court reaffirmed, that
there is no “space for legislative action [that is]
neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 719.
Rather, the statute’s application must account for
the Establishment Clause’s requirements. RFRA
does just that.
First, RFRA avoids creating an unyielding
religious preference by relieving “exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious
exercise.”
Id. at 720.
RFRA assesses the
“substantial[ity]” of those burdens and the sincerity
of religious belief case-by-case. See United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944). Second, RFRA
avoids denominational favoritism by applying to all
laws that substantially burden any religion’s
exercise. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720; cf. Bd. of Ed. of
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994) (invalidating a New York school district
created for a religious denomination). Third, RFRA
“take[s] adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”
See 544 U.S. at 720. Rather than provide an
“absolute and unqualified [statutory] right” to free
exercise, see id. at 722, RFRA’s framework requires

12
courts to decide exemption claims case-by-case,
considering whether substantial burdens on religious
exercise may persist in light of a compelling
government interest pursued in the least-restrictive
way. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37; cf.
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722-23 (“We have no cause to
believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an
appropriately balanced way . . . .”).
RFRA’s framework stands in stark contrast to
the religious preferences that the Court has found to
violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985)
(holding that a statute allowing Sabbath observers to
not work on any day they designate as their Sabbath
provides “unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath
observers over all other interests”) (emphasis added);
cf. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 337 n.15 (1987) (“This is a very different
case than [Caldor] . . . . In effect, Connecticut [in
Caldor] had given the force of law to the employee’s
designation of a Sabbath day and required
accommodation by the employer regardless of the
burden which that constituted for the employer or
other employees.”). Similarly, in Texas Monthly v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), the
Court invalidated a law exempting religious
literature from the state’s sales tax. Though the
justices could not agree on the basis for the law’s
unconstitutionality, RFRA has none of the problems
identified by members of the Court: a violation of
the freedom of the press, see id. at 26 (White, J.);
lending the government’s support to “the
communication of religious messages,” see id. at 28
(Blackmun, J.); or failing to lift a substantial burden
on religion or incorporate compelling government
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interests into the analysis, see id. at 18 n.8 (Brennan,
J.).
Put simply, a proper application of RFRA
cannot violate the Establishment Clause. Failing to
consider the government’s compelling interests—
including avoiding certain third-party harms—would
violate RFRA, regardless of the Establishment
Clause. The harmony RFRA crafted between “the
exercise of religion” and “other important values in
life” deserves affirmation by the Court.
See
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. at 704. An alternative view—one that
places “substantial” third-party harms above and
beyond RFRA’s framework—“could turn all
regulations into entitlements to which nobody could
object on religious grounds . . . .” Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2781 n.37. This view “could not reasonably
be maintained” in the face of the Court’s
jurisprudence or this country’s legislative practice.
See id.
II. THERE IS NO BASIS TO CONCLUDE
THAT
THE
POSSIBILITY
OF
“SUBSTANTIAL”
THIRD-PARTY
HARMS PRECLUDES RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS.
The Court has not allowed the possibility of
substantial third-party harms to trump religious
exemptions. Indeed, the Court has so held with
unanimity.
Hosanna-Tabor
held
that
the
First
Amendment’s “ministerial exception” to federal antidiscrimination statutes barred a retaliation claim
from an ordained teacher at a Lutheran school.
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012). The case
rested on both the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause, see, e.g., id. at 699, but neither
Clause was understood to thwart the right to church
autonomy because of a possible harm to third
parties. 16
There is no doubt that a third-party harm was
at stake in Hosanna-Tabor: The only reason why the
employee in the case could not sue her employer for
violating the Americans With Disabilities Act’s
retaliation prohibition was that the employer was a
religious organization. The means of protecting the
third-party interest in that case without recognizing
the ministerial exception—evaluating the application
of employment-discrimination laws against religious
organizations case-by-case—would result in illegal
government interference with a church’s governance.
See id. at 706.
“The interest of society in the enforcement of
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly
important. But so too is the interest of religious
It is logical for the two religion clauses to work in tandem
here. As the Court has recognized, there are contexts in which
the Free Exercise Clause compels religious exemptions—even
when doing so harms third parties. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at
144-45 (“This Court has long recognized that the government
may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices
and that it may do so without violating the Establishment
Clause.”).
Arguing that the Establishment Clause bars
religious exemptions simply because they harm third parties
would, as Professor Michael McConnell has explained,
“[p]aradoxically” eviscerate the Free Exercise Clause. See
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
at 691.
16
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groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs,
teach their faith, and carry out their mission.” 17 Id.
at 710. Giving heed to both religious freedom and
third-party harms in constitutional cases like
Hosanna-Tabor is consistent with both RFRA’s
statutory framework and the Court’s practice under
other statutes. 18
The Court has upheld statutory religious
exemptions even when the third-party interest
emanates from a statute, as is the case here. In
Amos,
the
Court
rejected
an
as-applied
Establishment Clause challenge to Title VII’s
exemption of religious employers from its prohibition
on religious discrimination. See 483 U.S. at 329-30.
This exemption allowed a religious employer to
terminate a building custodian based on his
religion—a clear third-party harm that the Court
found insufficient to block the statutory exemption. 19
The Court upheld the exemption because its purpose
was to “lift[] a regulation [Title VII] that burdens the
Even Hosanna-Tabor’s caveat—“express[ing] no view on
whether the [ministerial] exception bars other types of suits”—
undermines the view that religious exemptions must fail when
they raise substantial third-party harms. See id. By reserving
judgment on “the applicability of the exception to other
circumstances,” id., the Court embraced the same kind of caseby-case analysis of religious burdens and third-party harms
that RFRA embodies.
18 Additionally, the principle that substantial third-party harms
will not thwart the exercise of constitutionally-guaranteed
rights is no stranger to other First Amendment guarantees.
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19 Title VII was amended in 1972 so as to extend this religious
“exemption to all activities of religious organizations,” allowing
it to reach even a religious organization’s building custodians.
See id. at 332 n.9.
17
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exercise of religion.” Id. at 338. As Amos explained,
this purpose is distinct from an impermissible
advancement of religion.
Unlike statutes that
“delegate[] governmental power to religious
employers and convey[] a message of governmental
endorsement of religious discrimination,” id. at 337
n.15, this exemption simply “lifted” a governmental
burden on religion—returning the rights of the
religious employer and the employee to the preburden “baseline.”
RFRA provides the same
“baseline” here.
Just as in Amos, RFRA does not call for
religious exemptions that impermissibly advance
religion. As explained above, RFRA’s construction
and framework eschew outcomes prohibited by the
Establishment Clause. Instead, as Amos teaches,
the HHS mandate cannot be considered without the
Affordable Care Act’s incorporation of RFRA—just as
Title VII’s religious discrimination ban could not be
considered without its exemption for religious
employers. By its own terms, RFRA applies to any
subsequent federal statute unless the statute
expressly says otherwise, 20 and RFRA applies to that
statute’s implementation as well. 21
Because
Congress did not specifically exempt the Affordable
Care Act from RFRA, RFRA is part of that Act and
its implementation. This construction is meant to
ensure that the “baseline” contemplates religious
exemptions.

Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(b), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-3(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
21 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V. 1993).
20
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Like in Amos, the HHS mandate disrupts the
status quo by forcing religious nonprofits to provide a
benefit which imposes a religious burden—one
recognized by HHS when raised by churches and
their integrated auxiliaries and by the Court in the
context of for-profit corporations. To determine
whether the exemption added to Title VII to “lift”
this religious burden violated the Establishment
Clause as an impermissible advancement of religion,
Amos assessed whether “the Church’s ability to
propagate its religious doctrine . . . is any greater
now than it was prior to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.” See 483 U.S. at 337. It was
not—the statutory exemption simply returned the
religious organization’s (and the individual’s rights)
to a proverbial neutral: no new burden on religion or
new benefit to employee. RFRA has the same effect:
A religious exemption in its name simply “lifts” the
burden imposed on religious employers by the
Affordable Care Act, returning both the religious
employer and its employees to neutral.
That
“baseline” does not generate a “substantial” thirdparty harm that the government has a compelling
interest in preventing.
Amos teaches that the distinction between a
religious exemption that lifts a government-imposed
burden on religion and a statutory religious
preference is critical to understanding the proper
“baseline.” The statute at issue in Amos, like RFRA
here, are “shield[s] from . . . general regulatory
burden[s] imposed by the state, [not] . . . sword[s]
forcing others in the private sector to facilitate [the
claimant’s] religious practices . . . .” See Carl H.
Esbeck, Third-Party Harms, Congressional Statutes
Accommodating Religion, and the Establishment
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Clause 8 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, No. 2015-10, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607277. This distinction
puts the case here (like Amos) in contrast with
instances where the Court has found statutes
benefiting religious claimants unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15 (distinguishing
Caldor on the grounds that “[u]ndoubtedly, [the third
party’s] freedom of choice in religious matters was
impinged upon, but it was the Church . . . and not
the Government who put him to the choice of
changing his religious practices or losing his job. . .
.”); see also Esbeck, Third-Party Harms, at 8 (“Unlike
Caldor’s naked preference [for religion] where the
statute had government intervening in a privatesector dispute on the side of religion, in Amos
Congress did not vest religious employers with new
powers but left them with the same net powers as it
had before the passage of Title VII.”).
The distinction between a religious exemption
and a statutory religious preference also corrects the
scholars’ understanding of the Court’s decision in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977) (“TWA”). The scholars suggest that this case
allows religious exemptions to fail in the face of a de
minimis third-party harm. But, this conclusion
ignores that TWA was a religious-preference case.
The statutory provision at issue in TWA was
Title VII’s requirement that employers accommodate
their employees’ (and prospective employees’)
religious needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Unlike the
statute in Caldor, which afforded an “unyielding”
religious preference, this statute allowed the
employer to refuse religious accommodations that
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imposed an “undue hardship” on it. In defining
“undue hardship” to be only a “de minimis cost,” see
432 U.S. at 84, the Court does not mean that such
costs defeat religious exemptions. Unlike Amos or
this case, TWA did not present a general
governmental burden on religious exercise that a
religious claimant could seek statutory relief from.
By defining “undue hardship” to be nothing more
than a de minimis cost, the Court avoided an
Establishment Clause problem akin to the
“unyielding” preference in Caldor. Cf. 432 U.S. at 89
(Marshall, J. dissenting) (“The Court’s interpretation
of the statute, by effectively nullifying it, has the
singular advantage of making consideration of
[TWA’s] constitutional challenge unnecessary.”). But
Establishment Clause concerns about “unyielding”
statutory preferences for religion are irrelevant to the
“baseline” provided by religious exemptions from
governmental burdens.
The scholars advocating for a ban on RFRA
exemptions from the Affordable Care Act fail to
appreciate RFRA’s rule of construction and Amos.
These scholars assert that “[a]ny argument about
impermissible cost shifting [between the religious
claimant’s interest and the third-party’s alleged
harm] must identify the proper status quo ante as
the baseline measure of whether and to what extent
costs have been shifted.” 22 To them, this entails that
the “baseline” between the religious objector and the
third party should be set before RFRA was passed in
1993 23 or that it should assume the universal
availability of health-insurance coverage for
22
23

Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 371.
Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 371.
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contraceptives and abortifacients. 24 The net effect is
to make RFRA exemptions a disruption to the status
quo, resulting in an impermissible cost-shifting to
third parties that implicates the Establishment
Clause.
This argument—in addition to being
contrary to
Amos—proves too much: It would
undermine this nation’s long and rich history of
statutory exemptions for religion.
Indeed, in the context of “lifting a regulation”
that burdens free exercise, see Amos, 483 U.S. at
337-38, the Court has upheld statutory religious
exemptions that facially involve third-party harm.
These exemptions simply restore the “baseline” of
rights to their pre-religious-burden state—they do
not advance religion. The fact that this has the net
effect of removing a burden on religion while denying
a potential benefit to a third party is immaterial. As
the Court said in Amos, “[w]here . . . government acts
with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to
require that the exemption come packaged with
benefits to secular entities.” 483 U.S. at 337-38; see
also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“Nothing
in the text of RFRA or its basic purposes supports
giving the Government an entirely free hand to
impose burdens on religious exercise so long as those
burdens confer a benefit on other individuals.”).
170,000 Vietnam War draftees received
conscientious-objector deferments, see James W.
See Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe,
Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part II: What
Counts As A Burden on Employees?, BALKINIZATION, (Dec. 4,
2013),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-andestablishment-clause.html.
24
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Tollefson, THE STRENGTH NOT TO FIGHT: AN ORAL
HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS OF THE
VIETNAM WAR 7 (1993), even as the selective service
exemption for these objectors was facially limited to
those with a belief in a “Supreme Being” and the
granting of an objection sent a third party to war in
the objector’s place. See Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding the Military Selective
Service Act); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965). Generous wartime religious exemptions date
back to the Revolutionary War and the Quakers and
occurred even in the course of world wars. See, e.g.,
The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)
(finding no Establishment Clause violation in
military draft exemptions for clergy members,
seminarians, and pacifists).
Further, “[a]ll fifty states have enacted
statutes granting some form of testimonial privilege
to clergy-communicant communications.
Neither
scholars nor courts question the legitimacy of the
privilege, and attorneys rarely litigate the issue,”
even as the privilege—rooted in religious exercise—
imposes an obstacle to a third-party’s search for
truth. Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532
(9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Moreover, “the abortion context offers the
most systematic and all-encompassing example of
government efforts to ensure that unwilling
individuals”—often
individuals
with
religious
objections to abortion—“are not forced to engage in
what they believe to be killings.” Mark L. Rienzi,
The Constitutional Right Not To Kill, 62 EMORY L.J.
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121, 147 (2012). This particular context is quite
analogous to the RFRA exemption sought by the
Little Sisters of the Poor and other religious
nonprofits here, as these exemptions can result in
the lack of “seamless” access to government-funded
abortion.
Nevertheless,
“[c]oncern
about
discrimination against individuals who, for religious
or other moral reasons, objected to participating in
providing abortion services led to the widespread
adoption of conscience clause statutes.” Lynn D.
Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health
Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 180-81 (1993);
see also Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not To Kill,
62 EMORY L.J. at 148-49 (citing illustrative
“conscience clause” provisions and concluding that
“virtually every state in the country has some sort of
statute protecting individuals and, in many cases,
entities who refuse to provide abortions”).
The story is the same at the federal level. The
“Church Amendment,” which ensured that recipients
of particular federal funds were not obliged to
provide abortions and could not discriminate against
employees who would not participate in abortions,
see 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (2006), passed
overwhelmingly and became law in 1973.
In
advocating for the Amendment, Senator Ted
Kennedy explained that “Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to exempt individuals from
any requirement that they perform medical
procedures that are objectionable to their religious
convictions.” 119 CONG. REC. 9602 (1973) (emphasis
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added). The same sentiment followed for future
federal conscience protections. 25
The lack of “seamless” access to abortion
generated by these exemptions does not constitute a
third-party harm under the Court’s cases, even as a
compelling interest in protecting the right to
abortion exists in the Court’s cases. Indeed, in the
passage of RFRA, some of its advocates made clear
that RFRA would draw this exact distinction. See,
e.g.,
The
Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 192 (1992) (statement of
Nadine Strossen) (explaining that “[i]n the aftermath
of the Smith decision, it was easy to imagine how
religious practices and institutions would have to
abandon their beliefs in order to comply with
generally applicable, neutral laws. . . . At risk were
such familiar practices as . . . permitting religiously
sponsored hospitals to decline to provide abortion or
contraception services . . . .”); 139 CONG. REC. 9685
(1993) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) (explaining that
RFRA is “an opportunity to correct . . . injustice[s]”
like a “Catholic teaching hospital [that] lost its
accreditation for refusing to provide abortion
services”). To argue otherwise is to invite the Court
to question all of these statutory exemptions with a
These protections include the Danforth Amendment,
extending the refusal to participate in abortion or abortionrelated services beyond religious objections, see 42 U.S.C. §
238n, and the Hyde-Weldon Amendment, removing federal
funding from institutions that discriminate against healthcare
providers for not participating in abortions, see Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108–447, § 508, 118
Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004); see also Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 508(d)(1), 121 Stat. 1844,
2209.
25
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new constitutional doctrine grounded in speculation
about what constitutes a “substantial” burden on
third parties. But such judicial speculation is exactly
what the Court has sought to avoid. See Smith, 494
U.S. at 890 (rejecting an approach “in which judges
weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs”).
III.

THE THIRD-PARTY HARM OF
INSURANCE COVERAGE THAT IS
NOT “SEAMLESS” FAILS AS A
COMPELLING INTEREST.

The scholars calling for a ban on religious
exemptions that accompany “substantial” third-party
harms reason that “seamless coverage [of
abortifacients and contraceptives in insurance] is
essential to the validity of an accommodation under
RFRA in this context.” See, e.g., Law Professor
submission, Comment on the coverage of certain
preventative services under the Affordable Care Act,
(Oct. 21, 2014), at 4 (on file with author). 26 In other
words, no religious exemption may issue under
RFRA if it results in “delays or excess costs for
beneficiaries entitled to contraceptive coverage
without cost sharing.” Id. at 5. But under RFRA,
“seamless” coverage fails as a compelling interest.
By incorporating the assessment of third-party
harms into RFRA’s compelling-interest prong, see
See also Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 3 at 374-79; Micah
Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The
Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate,
(Nov.
27,
2013),
BALKINIZATION
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clauseand.html.
26
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Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n. 37, the statute
puts on the government the burden of showing that
these harms meet the compelling-interest test. That
test “is satisfied through application of the
challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
burdened.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863. As such, the
Court will “‘scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of
granting specific exemptions to particular religious
claimants,’ and ‘look to the marginal interest in
enforcing’ the challenged government action in that
particular context.” Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S.
Ct. at 2779 (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431)).
RFRA’s demanding standard follows from the
fact that it “did more than merely restore the
balancing test used in the Sherbert [v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963)] line of cases; it provided even
broader protection for religious liberty than was
available under those decisions.” Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2761 n.3. As Professor Michael Stokes
Paulsen observed, “the test is an extremely rigorous
one, referring to an extremely narrow range of
permissible justifications for infringements on
religious liberty. Not every legitimate, or even very
important, interest of government qualifies.”
Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, 56 MONT. L. REV.
at 263; cf. id. (“Only interests ‘of the highest order’
and ‘not otherwise served’ qualify, in the words of
Yoder. Sherbert’s words are even more strict: Only
‘the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation’ of
religious exercise.’”) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972), Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 42
(emphasis added) (original quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
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Even if the government possesses a compelling
interest in providing contraceptive and abortifacient
insurance coverage without cost-sharing, it has failed
to meet its burden to show such an interest in
“seamless” coverage. Satisfying its burden requires
the government to “specifically identify an actual
problem in need of solving” and to show that
burdening religious exercise “must be actually
necessary to the solution.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). But the government cannot
meet this burden.
There is a clear distinction between a right to
engage in certain activity and a compelling interest
in making cost-free access to that activity “seamless.”
Just as there are limitations that the Constitution
places on the harm to third parties in religious
exemptions, there are limits that the Constitution
places on abortion restrictions.
See Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77
(1992) (holding that a statute is unconstitutional
when it places an “undue burden” on a woman,
occurring when it has the “purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus”). Lacking
“seamless” access to abortion, however, is not such a
burden.
By granting the RFRA exemption sought in
this case, women working for the Little Sisters of the
Poor would be left with “the same range of
[insurance] choice[s] . . . as [they] would have had if
Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care
costs at all,” which the Court found acceptable in
upholding the Hyde Amendment. See Harris v.
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McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1980). This holding is
consistent with the effect of RFRA’s statutory
incorporation into the Affordable Care Act. As
discussed above, RFRA ensures that the “baseline” of
rights for the religious claimant and the third party
remains the same as it was before the new
governmental burden. As explained in McRae, a
woman’s constitutional right to abortion does not
result in “a constitutional entitlement to the
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of
protected choices.” Id. at 316. The government is
under no obligation to “remove those [obstacles to a
right] not of its own creation.” Id. This distinction
compliments the “baseline” distinction between
religious preferences and religious exemptions drawn
in Amos and supported by RFRA. See Amos, 483
U.S. at 337 n. 15 (“Undoubtedly, [the third party’s]
freedom of choice in religious matters was impinged
upon, but it was the Church . . . and not the
Government who put him to the choice of changing
his religious practices or losing his job. . . .”)
(emphasis added).
To deny a religious exemption under RFRA,
the third-party interest at stake must be an interest
that “the law deems compelling.” Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But, “the
government does not have a compelling interest in
each marginal percentage point by which its goals
are advanced.” See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741 n. 9.
There is thus no compelling interest in “seamless”
insurance coverage.
As the analogy to McRae
illustrates, the line between a third-party’s right and
a compelling government interest in “seamless”
access to that right, which is not compelling, is
critical.
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Justice Kennedy pressed the government on
this issue during oral argument in Hobby Lobby.
When asked if for-profit corporations faced the risk of
being “forced in principle to pay for abortions”
because they could not receive a religious exemption,
the government stated that that outcome would
“depend on the entity” seeking an exemption. See
Oral Arg. Tr. at 75:1-24, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (Mar. 25, 2014).
The
government argued that while a for-profit
corporation could be forced to pay for abortions, see
id. at 75:19-24—a position the Court’s decision in
Hobby Lobby puts in serious doubt—churches and
religious nonprofits would never be exposed to that
risk, see id. at 75:12-14 (“It certainly wouldn’t be
true, I think, for religious nonprofits. It certainly
wouldn’t be true for a church.”). But, in embracing a
“third-party harms” trump to a RFRA exemption for
religious nonprofits—while granting an exemption to
churches and their integrated auxiliaries—the
government has changed course. It is now forcing
religious nonprofits to provide “seamless” access of
abortifacients and contraceptive coverage while
exempting churches from the same obligation.
The Affordable Care Act and implementing
regulations offer exemptions that add additional
steps to securing insurance coverage—and thus deny
“seamless”
coverage—of
abortifacients
and
contraceptives to tens of millions of Americans. The
law exempts any plan that was in existence before
March 23, 2010 and did not make certain changes
afterwards from complying with the abortifacient
and contraceptive mandate. See 42 U.S.C. § 18011.
Indeed, this particular exemption is meant “simply
[to serve] the interest of employers in avoiding the

29
inconvenience of amending an existing plan.” Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. The statute itself also
exempts all employers with less than fifty employees
(employing approximately 34 million Americans)—
they are not required to provide insurance coverage
at all. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A); Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2764. Most relevant to the Little
Sisters of the Poor and other religious nonprofits
here, HHS exempted churches and their integrated
auxiliaries from complying with the mandate
altogether as well.
See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,870,
39,874 (July 2, 2013); 45 C.F.R. 147.131(a). In the
case of these “religious employers,” their exemption
hinges on how much control a church exerts over the
organization. See 26 C.F.R. 1.6033-2(h).
The government’s failure to give the Little
Sisters of the Poor and other religious nonprofits the
same exemption given to churches and their
integrated auxiliaries undermines a compelling
government interest in “seamless” coverage. For a
third-party harm in lacking “seamless” coverage to
constitute a compelling interest, the government’s
own underinclusiveness must not do “appreciable
damage to [the] supposedly vital interest prohibited.”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (quotation
omitted).
Here, the government’s interest in
“seamless” coverage is belied by the Affordable Care
Act itself, which authorizes the same exemption
sought here to tens of millions of Americans,
including churches and their integrated auxiliaries.
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (explaining that
women who work for exempted organizations may
seek insurance coverage on the government’s
exchanges or buy it on their own, “requir[ing]
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[women] to take steps to learn about, and to sign up
for, a new government funded and administered
health benefit.”). The government takes the position
that the Little Sisters of the Poor and other religious
nonprofits already have a “choice” not to provide
insurance
coverage
of
abortifacients
and
contraceptives, and that should settle the matter.
“But the fact that a choice was made according to
interest does not exclude duress.
It is the
characteristic of duress properly so called.” Union
P.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n., 248 U.S. 67, 70
(1918) (per Holmes, J.). The government’s singling
out of religious nonprofits for disparate treatment
puts religious exercise at stake.
“RFRA is inconsistent with the insistence of
an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between
different religious believers—burdening one while
accommodating the other—when it may treat both
equally . . . .” Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, HHS continues to discriminate among
religious organizations based on its own definition of
what organization is “religious enough” to receive an
exemption. HHS provided an exemption from its
contraceptive and abortifacient mandate to “houses
of worship and their integrated auxiliaries”—but not
to the Little Sisters of the Poor or other religious
nonprofits—because
employees
of
these
organizations, according to HHS, “are more likely
than other employers to employ people of the same
faith,” and, in its view, “less likely” to employ people
who desire contraceptives and abortifacients. See 78
Fed. Reg. at 39,874. Tellingly, the scholars arguing
against exempting religious nonprofits from the HHS
abortifacient and contraceptive insurance mandate
make an exception for churches and integrated
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auxiliaries too. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate, 49
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 380-81. “But a woman
working for a church suffers the same unrealizedbenefit ‘loss’ as does a woman working for” the Little
Sisters of the Poor. See Esbeck, Third-Party Harms,
at 13. Allowing the government to determine what
entities are “religious enough” to garner religious
exemptions undermines one of “the reasons the
United States is so open, so tolerant, and so free[:] no
person may be restricted or demeaned by
government in exercising his or her religion.” Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Denying religious nonprofits the same treatment as
churches—on the grounds that the Little Sisters of
the Poor and other religious nonprofits are not
“religious enough” to be worthy of the same
exemption as churches—demeans the Little Sisters
of the Poor and religious nonprofits. See id. at 2785
(“[F]ree exercise is essential in preserving their own
dignity and in striving for a self-definition shaped by
their religious precepts.”).
There cannot be a
compelling interest in demeaning free exercise.
CONCLUSION
Because the government’s asserted interest in
“seamless” coverage cannot satisfy the compellinginterest standard under RFRA, some scholars seek to
circumvent this standard with a new constitutional
doctrine focused on third-party harms. But RFRA
does exactly what is required in this “difficult”
area—“reconcile [the] two priorities” of protecting
third-party interests and protecting religious
exercise, see id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Letting one of these priorities automatically trump

32
the other when it is “substantial” has no basis and
invites judicial mishandling of this delicate harmony.
This mishandling could force believers to violate
deeply-held beliefs on matters that the Court
understands to be of grave significance. Amici
respectfully ask the Court to reject this end-run
around RFRA.
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